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Book Note
LIVING ORIGINALISM, by Jack M. Balkin'
CHANAKYA SETHI
JACK BALKIN IS ON A MISSION to prove that the idea of Living Originalism is

not "green pastel redness," which is to say, an oxymoron.' In attempting as much,
Balkin, a professor of law at Yale, presents an emerging alternative theory of
constitutional interpretation that seeks to reconcile the competing aspirations

of traditionally conservative Originalism 3 and traditionally liberal Living
Constitutionalism,' In Balkin's view, "we do not face a choice between living

constitutionalism and fidelity to the original meaning of the text" because "[t]hey
are two sides of the same coin."'

Given his sterling liberal credentials, Balkin's announcement five years ago
that he was an Originalist surprised many.6 His apparent conversion unleashed
a cottage industry of often angry replies, with fellow liberals assailing Balkin
for joining the other side after "finding that he coukdn't beat 'em" and conservatives
accusing him of co-opting their school with "little ... left of a recognizable
originalism."7 Living Originalism,then, is a rebuttal five years in the making.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2011) 480 pages.
The turn of phrase was once used to characterize another controversial idea in American
constitutional law. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A 7theory ofJudicialReview
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 18 ("[W]e apparently need periodic
reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel
redness"').
See e.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:FederalCourts andthe Law (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
See e.g. David A Strauss, 7he Living Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Supra note 1 at 20.
See Jack M Balkin, "Abortion and Original Meaning" (2007) 24:2 Const Comm 291.
Ethan J Leib, "The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism" (2007) 24:2 Const
Comm 353 at 353; John 0 McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, "Original Interpretative
Principles as the Core of Originalisr" (2007) 24:2 Const Comm 371 at 381.
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The book is divided into three parts. In Part I, Balkin explains his own
particular conception of Originalism-what he calls "framework originalism"' 8and seeks to distinguish it from alternatives. Balkin's principal contention is that
traditional Originalists engage in a subtle but crucial redefinition of "original
meaning" by limiting it to "original expected application."9 In doing so, they
obscure the significance of the framers' specific linguistic choices. In Balkin's
view, where the text provides an "unambiguous, concrete and specific
rule"-such as the minimum age requirement for the president-"the principles
or purposes behind the text cannot override the textual command."1 In contrast,
where the text provides for a principle-such as "equal protection" or "freedom of
speech"-"we must flesh out subsidiary principles that explain it."" For Balkin,
"the use of different types of legal norms and silences makes perfect sense." 2
Whereas clear-cut rules constrain freedom, "the vague and abstract language of
principles ... channel[s] politics ... by articulating a collection of key values and
commitments"-providing a framework, in other words.' 3 By crafting a text with
such distinctions, the framers recognized that "[t]he Constitution is an intergenerational project of politics" that must allow succeeding generations to engage
14
in their own "constitutional constructions."
In Part II, Balkin applies his theory in three now-controversial areas. In each
case, his focus is on original meaning as understood through evolving constitutional
constructions. On the Commerce Clause, he firmly rejects the view of traditional
Originalists, who look to the rise of the modern regulatory state either as wholly
anathema to the Clause's original meaning or as a "pragmatic" exception to it.' 5 In
Balkin's view, "the New Deal, while preserving the Constitution's original
meaning, featured a series of new constitutional constructions by the political
branches that were eventually ratified by the federal judiciary."' 6 On equal
protection, Balkin seeks to show why the gap between original expected application and original meaning matters, contending that the former cannot credibly
justify landmark civil rights decisions such as Brown v Board of Education while

8. * See supra note 1 at 21ff.
"9.

Ibid'at 7.

10. Ibid at 14.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibidat 24.
13. Ibidat 25.
14. Ibidat 75, 4.
15. Ibidat 138.
16. Ibid at 139 [emphasis in original].
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the latter can."7 Finally, though Balkin concedes that unenumerated rights are
misplaced under the Due Process Clause, he finds a constitutional home for
them-including those controversial ones concerning sexual autonomy-under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, long considered a dead letter by all except
some hard-core Originalists.' 8
In the third and final part, Balkin addresses concerns about the democratic
legitimacy of evolving constitutional constructions by courts. He contends that
such constructions reflect "changes in what kinds of positions are thought
reasonable and unreasonable, off the wall and on-the-wall ... prompted by the
contemporaneous work of the political branches and social mobilizations.'" For
that reason, the US Supreme Court's desegregation of public schools in Brown
"did not arise full-blown from the head of Earl Warren," just as the Court's
opinion in District of Columbia v Heller "largely followed the emerging public
vision of gun rights."2 In this way, "courts translate constitutional politics into
constitutional law" in a way that is "democratically responsive in the long run."2'
The book's achievement may also be its principal vulnerability. On a host
of hot-button topics, such as abortion, marriage equality, and the Commerce
Clause, of which the latter has taken on increased importance in light of the
challenge to the Obama administration's health care reform effort, Balkin's right
answer does not necessarily ask liberals to sacrifice much, if anything. To that
extent, some may argue that Living Originalism continues a rather American
tradition of constitutional interpretation merely being politics by other means.
That, however, may be just fine with Balkin.

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

Ibid at 226-28. See Brown v Boardof Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954) (finding that
state laws mandating separate schools for black and white students were unconstitutional).
Ibid at 191-92, 212-13. See McDonald v Chicago, 130 S Ct 3020 at 3059 (2010), Thomas J,
concurring (concluding that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the states through the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
Ibid at 306.
Ibid at 321, 324. See also Districtof Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008) (recognizing an
individual right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment).
Ibid at 325, 337.

